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HOW TO RESTORE THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY TO
ITS FULL UPRIGHT POSITION: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION TO




C AN A travel brochure save America's failing airline in-
dustry? Perhaps so, if that brochure is the slick, full-
color report put together by the National Commission to
Ensure a Strong, Competitive Airline Industry. Ap-
pointed by President Clinton and Congress on May 24,
1993, the Commission had a ninety-day mandate to study
the floundering industry and make recommendations to
aid its recovery.'
On August 19, 1993, two days before the deadline, the
Commission submitted its recommendations to the Presi-
dent and Congress. Titled "Change, Challenge and Com-
petition," the report is organized along three themes:
efficiency and technological superiority, financial
strength, and access to global markets.2 The colorful,
user-friendly format reflects the Commission's desire to
target a wide audience that the Commissioners referred to
as "the three Ps": press, public and politicians.
I NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG, COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY,
CHANGE, CHALLENGE AND COMPETITION 4 (1993) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT].
2 Id.
5 Baliles Says Airline Commission Targets Broad-Based Audience, AVIATION DAILY, Aug.
20, 1993 at 283.
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This comment will focus on the most controversial and
far-reaching of the Commission's recommendations,
which ranged from the creation of an independent corpo-
rate entity within the Department of Transportation to
broad tax relief measures that face opposition in Con-
gress.4 Parts II-IV will assess the airline industry's current
predicament and some theories as to how it got there. In
addition, these Parts will examine the creation of the
Commission and its task. Part V will explain and analyze
some of the more controversial, far-sighted proposals
within each of the three areas targeted in the report. Part
VI will point out areas that the Commission may have
overlooked. Finally, Part VII will examine the opposition
and obstacles the Commission's recommendations face
on the path to implementation or obscurity.
II. WHY THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY MATTERS
"Transportation is an infrastructure industry essential
for commerce, communications and national defense. It
is the veins and arteries through which commerce flows." 5
Air transportation's effects on the U.S. economy and na-
tional security are immeasurable. 6 From tourism to ship-
ping to business travel, airlines provide services essential
to the operation of almost every facet of society. Accord-
ing to the U.S. Travel and Tourism Administration, the
number of people annually entering the United States has
increased 54% from 1985 to 1990.7 Similarly, the amount
of money flowing into the U.S. economy within the same
time period more than doubled to $44.5 billion.8 In fact,
tourism, which largely depends on the airlines, is one of
the three most profitable industries in 37 states. 9
The aviation and aerospace industries are also major
4 See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
5 Paul S. Dempsey, The Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 9,
19 (1991).
6 Id. at 42.




employers of highly skilled workers. In 1992, airline in-
dustries employed 540,000 people, a 64% increase since
1982.10 These high-wage jobs contribute to economic
and technological strength in an increasingly competitive
global market." U.S. aerospace manufacturers are also
leading the way toward a global economy as the country's
largest manufacturing exporter and one of the few indus-
tries with a positive balance of trade.' 2
Airlines also contribute to the economic health of cities
and states. Besides paying their fair share of taxes, air-
lines provide a catalyst for growth in areas where busi-
nesses consider convenient transportation a relocation
draw.'"
III. WHERE THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY IS NOW
AND HOW IT GOT THERE
A. U.S. AIRLINES TODAY
Airline executives in this country have seen as many ups
and downs as their pilots; occasional financial crises are
part of the baggage that goes with the industry. 14 The
Commission notes that only once in the past twenty-five
years have the typically debt-laden airlines achieved the
profit margin average for U.S. industry.' 5 But even in civil
aviation's turbulent history, the present crisis is unparal-
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. Boeing estimates that U.S. airlines will take delivery of 4,200 passenger
jets worth $285 billion between now and 2010, while foreign airlines will require
7,700 aircraft at $535 billion. If historical trends continue, 65% of those units will
be U.S.-built. Id.
13 Id.
14 In 1947, for example, a presidential commission was appointed to study the
"serious crisis" of domestic airlines' $22 million loss that year. COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 4. The 1993 Commission cites this as one of the bumps
encountered in the industry's meteoric growth since the first flight at Kitty Hawk
in 1903. Id.
The Commission Report also refers to the production demands of World War
II and the 1981 air traffic controllers' strike as periods of stagnation or decline
among massive spurts of growth in civil aviation. Id.
15 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
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leled.' 6 With two major airlines already dead and buried,
at least four other carriers are liquidating furiously or
huddling in bankruptcy.' 7 Others, such as USAir, have re-
sponded by laying off workers, reducing flights, and bow-
ing out of some markets.' 8 New entrants, such as People
Express and Air Florida, were swallowed up in mergers or
fell into bankruptcy alongside some of the old
standards. 19
Perhaps the most solid evidence of this unprecedented
crisis is the more than thirty-five billion dollars of debt the
industry faces. 20 Almost eleven billion dollars of that debt
has accumulated since 1990.21 After three straight years
of record losses, not even the profits for the July-Septem-
ber quarter of 1993 could give the airlines the boost they
needed. 2 In fact, that bit of good news generated fear
among industry analysts that the Clinton Administration
might feel less pressure to act. 23 The Commission cau-
tioned against such hasty hopes; it found that the airlines
would have to post unprecedented profits for years before
being comfortably in the black. 4
16 See Dempsey, supra note 5, at 9.
'7 Id. at 10. Eastern Airlines finally went under in January 1991 after attempts
at liquidation and reorganization. Id. Pan Am followed suit shortly thereafter.
Aviation Turmoil; Most Commission Recommendations Are Good, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 27, 1993, at 14A. TWA, America West and Midway have slipped into bank-
ruptcy, Dempsey, supra note 5, at 10, from which Continental has just emerged for
the second time. Aviation Turmoil, supra, at 14A. And virtually all of the airlines in,
at the brink of and just out of bankruptcy are liquidating assets feverishly to stay
above ground. Dempsey, supra note 5 at 10.
18 Dempsey, supra note 5, 6, at 11.
19 Id. at 10.
20 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
21 Richard M. Weintraub, Airlines Fly Into the Blue; 3rd-Quarter Profits Could End 3-
Year Nosedive, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1993, at CI.
22 Id.
213 Id. The Air Transport Association's vice president for industry data, David
A. Swierenga, said the industry is not out of the woods yet, and is still looking to
the Clinton administration to follow through on its commission recommenda-
tions. Id.
24 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
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B. SOME THEORIES OF THE DESCENT
While little disagreement exists concerning the severity
of the airline industry's woes, debates rage concerning the
causes behind the crisis. At the heart of some of the most
heated controversies are the effects of deregulation. 5
Paul S. Dempsey noted in 1991 that
[a]ll the world's airlines are paying the sharply higher fuel
prices inspired by the Persian Gulf crisis, and all are suf-
fering from the early pangs of global recession. But only
America's are in bankruptcy, only America's have died,
and only America's are selling off operating assets-de-
spite the fact that international aviation fuel costs more
than domestic fuel.26
The Commission, however, found that the airline in-
dustry is more competitive and charges passengers and
shippers less in real dollars than it did in 1978 before de-
regulation.2 7 The Commission instead blamed more re-
cent developments, finding that "in 1990 a series of
events began that carried through 1992 and severely dam-
aged the economic underpinning of the industry. '28 Sev-
eral of these factors are identified in the Commission
report.
1. The Recession
Faltering economic conditions at home meant fewer
business travellers and vacationers. In fact, in 1991 air-
lines saw the first decrease in passengers in a decade.2 9
25 Compare Tom Belden, New Fuel for Deregulation's Critics, A National Commission
Studied Airlines for 90 Days. Its Findings Have Sparked Renewed Protest, PHILADEL-
PHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 27, 1993, at D5 (organization formed to oppose Commission
finding that deregulation not to blame) with Gerald L. Baliles, The Last Thing the
Airlines Need is Re-Regulation, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1993, at C7 (noting that Com-
mission chairman says most experts consulted "did not feel that deregulation had
been a real factor in airline and aerospace industry problems").
26 Dempsey, supra note 5, at 12; see also Thomas Eagleton, Curing the Airline Indus-
try, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 29, 1993, at 3B (listing reasons for the poor
showing of the "Big Three" even after deregulation).
27 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
28 Id. at 4.
29 Id.
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Even the record 473 million boarded in 1992 could not
boost profits because the low fares that enticed travelers
often failed to cover airline costs. 3 0
2. The Gulf War
The Middle East crisis in 1991 cut off major oil supplies
and created a sudden, extreme increase in jet fuel
prices.3 ' Although activation of the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF)3 2 did not seem to disrupt regularly sched-
uled flights, 3 low passenger traffic may be blamed in part
on fear of terrorism generated by the war itself.3 4
3. The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)
Enacted in 1986 to prevent income-generating corpora-
tions from escaping federal taxes by excessive deduc-
tions, 5 the AMT penalizes capital intensive industries
such as steel producers, oil drillers and airlines by subject-
ing them to a minimum tax, even when they are operating
at a loss.3 6 The Commission reports that from 1990 to
1992 the airlines paid $670 million in AMT, even though
they incurred $10 billion in losses.3 7 Some airlines had to
-o Id.; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
31 Id. at 17.
32 Lester Reingold, CRAF a 'Qualified' Success, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Aug.
1991, at 24. The CRAF was developed during the Korean War to supplement
military transport planes. Under the program, which was first activated for Oper-
ation Desert Shield, participating civil airlines may be called to carry cargo or
troops on as little as 24 hours notice. In return, CRAF carriers receive some pref-
erential consideration in the award of routine military-charter contracts. Id.
3 Id. Pan Am canceled fewer than a dozen flights, and rerouted passengers
reportedly responded to the changes with support for Operation Desert Storm.
Id.
, Id. Even some of the airlines were worried. TWA, for instance, painted out
the logo on its participating planes. A spokesman explained that the security mea-
sure was prompted by terrorist attacks on the carrier in 1985 and 1986. Id.
35 Id. at 16.
36 Airline Commission Calls for Changes in Tax Policy, AVIATION DAILY, Aug. 31,
1993, at 335.
37 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. The following is information the
Commission gathered from the General Accounting Office on U.S. effective tax
rates:
[Effective tax rates expressed as a percent of income]
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borrow money just to pay these taxes.38
4. Restrictive Government Policies and Processes
The regulatory burden on airlines has grown steadily
and proved unnecessarily costly to the airline industry. 9
The Commission estimated that major regulations have
cost the industry more than $3.5 billion since 1984. Yet
as staggering as this figure seems, it does not include the
more recent airworthiness directives introduced between
1989 and 1992, and heightened security measures en-
acted during the Gulf War, which have added another
$1.1 billion to the pot.40
Cumbersome federal procurement procedures burden
the airlines as well. The process of resolving urgent
transportation needs often takes five or six years, and at
times, as many as ten years if all does not go smoothly.4 '
The FAA, for instance, has identified 250 documents con-
taining 4,500 citations of "required activities" for acquisi-
tion officials.42 Part of the problem may be lack of
communication. Congress and federal agencies, for ex-
ample, often act in isolation or under the pressure of spe-
cial interest groups and therefore fail to comprehend the
cumulative impact of their actions.43
1986 1987 1988 1989
Airlines -43.5 25.7 36.4 110.3
Railroads -113.2 15.6 11.8 15.1
Trucking 28.4 30.7 18.2 26.1
Id.
, Id.
39 Id. at 13.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id. at 16. In 1986, for example, airport delays created the need for instru-
ment landing systems (ILS) at certain airports. Congress appropriated money for
the procurement of this basic equipment as quickly as 1987. Yet because the pro-
cess would not allow the FAA to acquire the systems immediately from its usual
supplier, the first ILS was not delivered until 1990. Id.
412 Id. The documents made a stack 11 feet high. Id.
43 Id. at 11.
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5. The Bankruptcy Laws
Some airlines have accused the bankrupt carriers of
abusing the protective laws of Chapter 1 1 to compete un-
fairly with healthy carriers.4 4 Though the Commission
clearly states that bankrupt carriers have contributed to
the financial deterioration of the airlines, it comes short of
making any accusations of deliberate abuse.4 5 Instead,
the report focuses on how airlines mired in bankruptcy
affect the entire industry by tying up scarce gates at busy
airports and making ineffective use of limited-entry inter-
national route authority.4 6
44 Transportation Secretary Federico Pena Interviewed (CNN television broadcast,
Aug. 19, 1993). The "big three" (American, Delta and United) complain that air-
lines under Chapter 11 protection operate at an advantage by being able to offer
drastically slashed fares. On a Wing and a Dime, Economist, June 12, 1993, at 10.
By concentrating on cash flow rather than profits, bankrupt carriers made it more
difficult for solvent airlines to compete for the same passengers. Perry A. Trunick,
We Need Competition Among Equals, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUrIoN, April, 1992, at 9. The
short-sightedness of carriers that compete for the sake of cash flow, however,
helps create an "arbitrary deflation" that does not reflect true market-driven com-
petition. Id.
4- COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. The Commission said that it "does
not believe any airline prefers bankruptcy as a condition of doing business," and
cites reduced consumer confidence, significant loss of traffic and decreased reve-
nues as deterrents to this approach. Id. Transportation Secretary Pena also tried
to soften accusations of abuse of bankruptcy laws by delivering the "good news"
that two airlines have recently come out of bankruptcy. Jeanne Meserve, Transpor-
tation Secretary Federico Pena Interviewed, supra note 44. But neither explanation ac-
counts for the airlines' incentive to abuse Chapter lI's protections once they have
gone into bankruptcy, or how the airlines are climbing out of bankruptcy under
extremely difficult financial conditions.
46 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. The megacarriers claim over-
capacity-empty seats, stagnant gates and unused routes-stems from the ability
of some carriers to operate under Chapter 11 protection. On a Wing and a Dime,
supra note 42, at 10. But Seth Schofield, chairman of USAir, says the big three
increased their total capacity by 35% from 1991-1993, despite the recession,
while the rest of the industry grew only by about 10%. Id. The problem may lie
in the long-term leases that allow airlines exclusive control of airport gates and
other facilities, id., or in the closely guarded bilateral agreements that control in-
ternational route allocations. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. While an
argument for some regulation in these areas exists, market forces eventually dom-
inate: Trans World Airlines (TWA), for instance, helped itself out of bankruptcy
by selling off some of its most profitable international routes and giving up con-
trol of its gates at Lambert Field to St. Louis for $70 million. TWA Survives Red
Ink; Airline's Bankruptcy Ends with Celebration, but Struggle Not Over, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 1993, at IA.
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6. Bad Business Decisions
The airline industry itself must shoulder some of the
blame for its own financial strife, particularly when it is
responsible for accumulating $35 billion in debt.47 The
airlines, along with many other industries, took on enor-
mous debt in the 1980s with the expectation that business
would continue to grow at the same rate into the next dec-
ade.48 When the economy weakened at the dawn of the
1990s, airlines found it necessary to cancel orders for air-
craft49 and drop fares to nearly below cost.50
These attempts to save the industry simply lowered it
further into the abyss. Manufacturers already suffering
from military spending cuts and a weak world economy
were hit hard by the rash of cancellations. The fare wars
of the summer of 1992, during which major and regional
airlines tried to boost traffic by offering absurdly dis-
counted fares,51 resulted in even greater losses despite an
increase in traffic.52
47 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
4 News Conference with Gerald Baliles, Chairman, National Commission to
Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, Federal News Service (Aug. 19,
1993).
49 Id.
5) COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
.1 Ease the Squeeze on U.S. Airlines, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,July 8, 1991, at
7. The editors of Aviation Week and Space Technology used the example of America
West helping itself into bankruptcy by offering 50% discounts on fares. The dis-
count fares had the effect of increasing traffic, but the airline continued to lose
money. Id. Air France Chairman Bernard Attali characterized the pricing war as
collective suicide, noting with distaste that "[c]annibalism has become a strategic
model." Air France Chairman Attacks Cut-Throat American Aviation Tactics, AVIATION
DAILY, Sept. 9, 1992, at 424.
52 Ease the Squeeze on U.S. Airlines, supra note 51, at 7. At the height of the ticket-
slashing frenzy, which began with a half-price war between American and North-
west in late May and early June of 1992, airlines sold nearly 40 million tickets in
10 days. Fare War is Top Story; 1992's Ten Biggest Newsmakers Also Include Hurricanes,
CRS Rules, TRAVEL WKLY., Jan. 7, 1993, at 1. American introduced a seemingly
logical, four-tier pricing structure, cutting first class fares by 20-50% and coach by
38%, and eliminating most special rates and negotiated fares. Id. But the airline's
plan failed as the industry suffered from overcapacity and traffic decreases. Id.
67119941
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IV. THE COMMISSION'S MEMBERS AND THEIR
TASK
Congress created the National Commission to Ensure a
Strong, Competitive Airline Industry on April 7, 199353
and gave it a mandate to study, investigate and make rec-
ommendations for the future health and competitiveness
of U.S. airlines. 4 Commission members were drawn from
a cross-section of industry leaders and experts represent-
ing aviation, economics, finance, labor relations, interna-
tional trade, marketing, and manufacturing.5 5 Of the 15
voting members, five were appointed by the Senate, five
by the House and five by the President. The chairman
was a voting member appointed by the President in con-
sultation with the House Speaker and the Senate majority
leader.56
President Clinton and Transportation Secretary Pena
issued a broad challenge to the Commission to review
55 National Commission to Ensure a Strong, Competitive Airline Industry, Pub.
L. No. 103-13, 107 Stat. 43 (1993).
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
55 Id.
56 Id. The 15 voting members follow:
Chairman:
Gerald L. Baliles, Partner in the law firm of Hunton & Williams; Governor of
Virginia 1986-90; Attorney General of Virginia, 1982-85.
Members:
Bette B. Anderson, President, Kelly, Anderson and Assoc., Inc., management
consultants; Undersecretary of the Treasury for Administration, 1977-81.
Capt. J. Randolph Babbitt, President, Air Line Pilots Assoc.; Captain, Eastern
Airlines.
Charles M. Barclay, President, American Assoc. of Airport Executives; staff
member, Aviation Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 1977-83.
Robert F. Daniell, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, United Technologies
Corp.
Sylvia A. de Leon, Partner in the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and
Feld; Coordinator of Transportation Issues, Clinton-Gore Presidential Transition,
1992.
Daniel M. Kasper, Vice President and Director of Transportation Practice, Har-
bridge House (now a part of Coopers & Lybrand); Director of the Bureau of Inter-
national Aviation, U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, 1979-83.
Herbert D. Kelleher, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, South-
west Airlines; Chairman, Partnership for Improved Air Travel, 1989-91.
Russell W. Meyer, Jr,, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Cessna Aircraft
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every aspect of the aviation and aerospace industries and
to make recommendations for a stronger, more flexible
and more competitive industry both at home and
abroad. Once appointed, the commissioners had ninety
days to make their recommendations.58
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Airline Commission, after reviewing the status of
the industry and identifying what it believed to be the
sources of industry problems, distinguished three factors
essential to the future health and competitiveness of the
airlines: 1) efficiency and technological superiority, 2) fi-
nancial strength and flexibility, and 3) access to global
markets.5 9 Within this framework, the Commission heard
opinions and suggestions from more than 150 industry
leaders60 and made sixty-seven findings and fifty-nine rec-
Co.; Chairman of the Board, General Aviation Manufacturers Assoc., 1974 and
1982.
John F. Peterpaul, Vice President for Transportation, International Assoc. of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
Sandra Pianalto, First Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Cleveland; Economist, Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Staff,
House Budget Committee.
John H. Robson, Lester Crown Fellow, Yale School of Organization and Man-
agement; Co-chair, Advisory Council on Regulatory Reform, Heritage Founda-
tion; Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, 1989-92; Chairman, U.S. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 1975-77.
Felix G. Rohatyn, Senior Partner, Lazard Freres & Co., investment bankers;
Chairman, Municipal Assistance Corp. for the City of New York; Member of the
Board, Pfizer, Inc., Pechiney S.A. and Howmet Corp.
Abraham D. Sofaer, Partner in the law firm of Hughes Hubbard & Reed; Legal
Adviser, U.S. State Dep't, 1985-90; U.S. Dist. Judge for the Southern Dist. of New
York, 1979-85.
Gina F. Thomas, Managing Attorney, International Regulatory Office, Federal
Express Corp.; Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transporta-
tion, 1983-92. Id. at 28.
In addition, the eleven non-voting members are Senators John Danforth, J.
James Exon, Slade Gorton, Ernest Hollings and Patty Murray; Representatives
Robert Borski, Maria Cantwell, Richard Gephardt, Newt Gingrich, and Bud




59 Id. at 2.
- Id. at 28-32. Industry leaders and experts included airline and manufactur-
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ommendations to the president and Congress on Aug. 19,
1993.6' Following are some of the recommendations
made within each of the Commission's target areas.
A. EFFICIENCY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY
Technological advances are often thwarted by the slow-
moving federal procurement process. New navigational
systems and other breakthroughs cannot be accommo-
dated by the snail's pace of federal bureaucracy. 2 And
even if the red tape were somehow extracted from the
equation, the volatile, now-you-see-it, now-you-don't fed-
eral budget process inhibits the financial stability and pre-
dictability necessary for strategic capital investments in
new technology.63
1. Restructure the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The FAA employs about 50,000 people, more than
17,700 of whom are air traffic controllers. 64 Nearly 45%
of the FAA budget goes to air traffic control. 65 Besides
running the system that keeps tabs on thousands of pri-
vate and commercial aircraft on the ground and in the air,
the FAA also regulates airworthiness, pilot and crew train-
ing, and airport security.66 Though government control
ing executives, Wall Street analysts, investment bankers, labor representatives,
professors of law and of economics, and environmental organizations. Id.
The Commission spent its first three weeks gathering data and information
from industry experts on aerospace manufacturing, international negotiations,
airport capacity, deregulation, domestic and international competition, air cargo,
environmental issues and workforce concerns. Id. at 28-30. Work teams on sys-
tem capacity, domestic aviation, international issues and finance met to hammer
out issues and options throughout the fourth week, and weeks five and six were
devoted entirely to detailed briefings by experts on the issues identified by the
work teams. Id. at 30-32.
61 Id. at 32. The Commission proudly notes that its work was completed on the
88th day of its existence, two days before deadline. Id.
62 Id. at 2; see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
63 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
- Richard M. Weintraub, FAA Chief Favors a Study of Privatizing Air System, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at D12. The number, computed on July 31, 1993, does not




seems appropriate for air travel and safety, the obvious
need for technological advances in this area may not best
be served by Congressional processes.67
The Commission found that "there is a fundamental in-
consistency between the processes of government and the
operation of a 24-hour-a-day, high-technology, capital-in-
tensive air traffic control system."' 6  The FAA must have
control of its own funds in order to invest in state-of-the-
art technology, improve efficiency, and attract highly
skilled workers. 69  Therefore, the Commission recom-
mends fundamentally restructuring the FAA and remov-
ing it entirely from the federal budget process, 70 although
it emphasizes that the government should maintain policy
control and oversee safety.7 '
67 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Aside from procurement diffi-
culties, Congressional pork barrelling may also require the FAA to provide serv-
ices to unprofitable or even untenable locations. See, e.g., President Clinton Endorses
ATC Corporation, EAS Subsidy Cutbacks, AIRPORTS, Sept. 7, 1993, at 352 (noting that
nine communities receiving subsidies for essential air services carried five or fewer
passengers a day).
Vice President Gore's National Performance Review report, Creating a Govern-
ment That Works Better and Costs Less, calls for a reduction in EAS subsidies, id.,
contrary to the Commission's recommendation to promote policies which en-
courage air service to small communities and maintain the EAS program "at suffi-
cient levels to serve its legislative purpose." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at
27. The Commission bases its recommendation on the needs of smaller commu-
nities to be connected to the national air transportation system in order to market
their goods and services, id., but Gore's report suggests eliminating subsidies only
in communities within 70 miles of a hub airport and limiting funding to $200 per
passenger. President Clinton Endorses ATC Corporation, EAS Subsidy Cutbacks, supra.
The Commission's concern for communities that have put a large amount of
money into airport development based on government promises or which have
been downgraded from jets to prop planes, COMMISSION REPORT, Supra note 1, at
27, sounds like some pork barrel maintenance of its own.
6 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. The Commission illustrates this mis-
match with the FAA's attempt to implement the National Airspace System Plan.
In 1982, the FAA began implementation of the plan with completion scheduled in
1993 at a cost of $12.6 billion. Renamed the Aviation System Capital Investment
Plan, it now has 155 new projects, and major elements are three to five years late.
The cost is now estimated at $32 billion. The Commission noted that "this sys-
tem, which was intended to bring 1960s technology into the 1980s, might not
even be ready for the next century." Id. at 7.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 8.
71 Id. at 9.
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The recommendation involves creation of an independ-
ent air traffic control (ATC) corporation within the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) to manage and fund
traffic control and related functions with the ability to
raise and maintain its own source of revenue for opera-
tions, maintenance and capital investments. 72 This in-
cludes the ability to issue long-term bonds for capital
purchases and the managerial flexibility to attract and
maintain high-caliber leadership and staff.73 The Com-
mission left questions of specific structure and implemen-
tation to a panel of FAA industry experts to be established
in cooperation with the Department of Defense, which
will continue to receive air traffic control service in line
with national security requirements.74
Shortly after release of the Commission's recommenda-
tions, widespread approval for What is being called priva-
tization of the FAA echoed from almost every sector of
the airline and travel industry.7 5 The National Air Traffic
Controllers Association rallied in Washington in Septem-
ber to "draw attention to issues threatening the safety and
efficiency" of the government's air traffic control sys-
tem. 76 Fearing that "bureaucratic bungling and waste"
will destroy the United States' reputation for "the safest
and most efficient" skies in the world, the union lobbied
members of Congress for FAA reform as a quasi-govern-
ment corporation.77
72 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. All present expenditures and reve-




75 See Business Wire (Atlanta), Aug. 19, 1993 (Delta); id. (Chicago), Aug. 19, 1993
(United); PR Newswire, Aug. 19, 1993 (American Automobile Assoc.). Commis-
sion Chairman Baliles cautions that "the Commission does not call for privatizing
anything," Baliles Seeks Higher-Quality Debate Over A TC Corporation, AVIATION DAILY,
Sept. 15, 1993, at 416, and stresses that safety oversight is to stay with the govern-
ment. Gerald L. Baliles, The Last Thing the Airlines Need Is Re-Regulation, WASH.
POST, Sept. 26, 1993, at C7.





Vice President Gore specifically cited the recommenda-
tion in the report from the National Performance Review,
his own panel's recommendations for "reinventing" the
federal government. 78 Following the Commission's lead,
Gore recommended the ATC be reinvented as "a govern-
ment-owned corporation, supported by user fees and gov-
erned by a board of directors that represents the system's
customers. 79 President Clinton put his stamp of ap-
proval on the recommendation, via Vice President Gore's
National Performance Review report, almost immediately.8 0
Though official approval of the concept of an independ-
ent ATC corporation was quick and uneventful, strong
opposition emerged from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association (AOPA). Responding to the National Perform-
ance Review's whole-hearted approval of the Commission's
recommendation, AOPA President Phil Boyer said "[t]he
NPR report seems to conclude that there is 'overwhelm-
ing consensus' within the aviation community that the
ATC system should be turned over to a government-
owned corporation .... [T]his is not the case."'" Boyer
expressed concern that safety and sound public policy will
be sacrificed for economy when there is no proof that the
proposal would result in better efficiency.8 2 Recalling the
comparison some made between the proposed ATC cor-
poration and the U.S. Postal Service, 3 also a corporate
entity, Boyer said, "[i]f the Postal Service is the embodi-
78 Gore Backs ATC Reform, Essential Air Service Cutbacks, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 8,
1993, at 375 (noting that Vice President Gore's National Performance Review re-
port, Creating a Government That Works Better & Costs Less, makes recommendations
for streamlining, or "reinventing," the federal government).
79 Id. Gore said the new structure would increase revenues as customer use
rises, providing needed funds to meet increased demands, finance new technol-
ogy, and improve safety. At the same time, the FAA could be relieved of its opera-
tional duties and concentrate on safety regulation. Similar corporations, he
notes, are in effect in Great Britain and New Zealand. Id.
80 President Clinton Endorses A TC Corporation, EAS Subsidy Cutbacks, AIRPORTS, Sept.
7, 1993, at 352.
8I AOPA Opposes Plan to Create Independent Government Corporation to Run ATC,
WKLY. OF Bus. AVIATION., Sept. 27, 1993, at 134.
82 Id.
83 Privatize the FAA, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 17, 1993, at B4.
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ment of what we can expect in terms of management effi-
ciencies to be gained from a government-owned
corporation, we think our case against the idea is
reinforced." 84
But, Commission Chairman Gerald Baliles said that
such concerns are what he hopes to be "the last gasps of a
losing argument.185 Safety would not be affected, he said,
because the corporate entity is to be housed within the
DOT with the federal government retaining policy control
and safety oversight.86 As to the FAA's current safety and
efficiency record, cited by the AOPA,87 Baliles challenged
anyone who reads the Airline Commission report to "tell
[him] that the current procurement and funding system
makes sense, can be defended or is getting the job
done." 88
In the meantime, newly appointed FAA chief David
Hinson has approached the matter cautiously. While he
values his unique opportunity to be an instrumental part
of such fundamental change, he is maintaining a "show-
me" attitude toward the proposed makeover.8 9 Some in-
dustry watchers have interpreted this attitude as support
for the plan, 90 but Hinson remains uncommitted, prefer-
ring a more in-depth study on the proposed changes
before any moves are made. 9' "If it gives us a better air
traffic control system, we should do it," he said "[b]ut we
11 AOPA Opposes Plan to Create Independent Government Corporation to Run ATC, supra
note 81. Boyer followed the statement with consolations to the "hard-working
employees of the Postal Service," but recounted that the inefficiencies inherent in
the system's structure are innumerable. Id.
'5 Balies Seeks Higher-Quality Debate Over A TC Corporation, AVIATION DAILY, Sept.
15, 1993, at 416. In a speech to the Wings Club in New York, Baliles called for a
debate that is on "a higher plane." Id.
8i Id.
87 AOPA Opposes Plan to Create Independent Government Corporation to Run A TC, supra
note 81, at 134.
" Baliles Seeks Higher-Quality Debate Over A TC Corporation, supra note 85, at 416.
'1 Richard M. Weintraub, FAA Chief Favors a Study of Privatizing Air System, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at D12.
W See FAA Head Backs Plan for Independent ATC, FLIGHT INT'L, Sept. 8, 1993.
91 Weintraub, supra note 89, at D12.
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don't know that." 92
2. Decrease the Regulatory Burden
Lack of communication among the various bodies
whose actions affect the airline industry creates a massive
accumulation of regulations and costs. 93 The Commis-
sion determined that the industry and the FAA must more
regularly exchange information, and that Congress and
the DOT must be better informed of the costs and effects
of their regulations and proposals.94 It recommends that
the FAA keep an annual regulatory budget to which all
but emergency safety regulations are subject, and that an
independent mechanism be established to provide
outside guidance for cost-benefit analyses. 95 Though ar-
guments in favor of increased red tape are rare, it is some-
times best to leave well enough alone. FAA Administrator
Hinson sees no problem with the FAA's dual role of en-
suring safety and promoting the airline industry.9 6 In-
deed, he says subjecting regulations to cost-benefit
analysis is perfectly appropriate.97
92 FAA Administrator, Intelligence, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 22, 1993, at 455.
93 The Commission report relates an FAA requirement for the installation of
systems to control access to secured areas. FAA's initial cost-benefit analysis esti-
mated implementation costs at $168 million, but airlines projected that it would
initially cost $658 million, and another $220 million for maintenance over the
next 10 years. Once the major airports had installed the systems, however, the
FAA clarified the rule to reduce the area to be controlled, stating that although
$400 million had already been spent, the reduction would save the five airports $5
million. To date, the cost has climbed to $500 million and is expected to exceed
$700 million by completion. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
94 Id.
95 Id. To improve communication, the Commission also recommended that
Congress and the DOT be better informed of the costs of their own proposals;
that Congress, the DOT and the FAA clearly define their proposals to be more
effective and efficient; that the FAA receive cost impact data from the industry
early in the regulatory process; and that the FAA and DOT, in consultation with
the industry, review, reduce and amend existing regulations. Id.
96 FAA Administrator Intends Only Minimal Employee Testing for Alcohol, AVIATION
DAILY, Sept. 2, 1993, at 352.
97 Id.
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3. Implementing the Global Positioning System (GPS)
Already in place, this satellite navigational system, ac-
cording to the Commission, could revolutionize air traffic
control by providing users around the world with instant
and precise position information, allowing more direct
routes and fewer delays.98 Nevertheless, the FAA has
delayed implementing the super-accurate navigational
system despite industry demands for immediate use.99
One reason may be a fear of installing GPS only to find
international carriers using another form of Global Navi-
gation Satellite System (GNSS).I°O But the airline and avi-
ation industries, eager for the substantial fuel savings
from flying more direct routes,' 0 ' are unwilling to wait for
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to
decide on a system.10 2
The Commission has ambitiously recommended setting
the goal for implementing the GPS system into commer-
cial air traffic control by 1996, and full integration with a
modernized ATC system by the end of 1997.103 The sys-
98 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. The GPS comprises 24 satellites
orbiting the earth on six orbital planes (four satellites per orbit about 11,000
miles out). Id.
99 See Bruce D. Nordwall, FAA Speeds GPS Approval, 1993 Operations Planned, Avi-
ATION WKLY. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 19, 1992, at 30 (Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics (RTCA) study showed broad consensus in aviation and airline
industries supporting rapid installation of GPS, and predicted the system would
be certified and operating next year (1993) at most airports). But see Industry Impa-
tient with FAA Progress on GPS, Will Not Wait for ICAO, AVIATION DAILY, July 29,
1993, at 156 (industry representatives tell House Public Works aviation subcom-
mittee that the FAA is falling behind in developing procedures and air traffic con-
trol for GPS).
100 Industry Impatient with FAA Progress on GPS, Will Not Wait for ICAO, supra note
99, at 156. The Commission pointed out that the rest of the world has shied away
from GPS because it is a U.S. military system. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1,
at 7.
,1 See Nordwall, supra note 99, at 30. In a 1992 DOT experiment, one airline
paid for GPS equipment with one week's fuel savings. Id.
102 Industry Impatient with FAA Progress on GPS, supra note 99, at 156. House Pub-
lic Works aviation subcommittee chairman James Oberstar said, "[i]f we wait for
the Europeans it is the tail wagging the dog." Id.
,03 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. The Commission suggests expedit-
ing implementation and modernization of the system through such means as a
public-private consortium. Id.
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tern can be a component of GNSS or one of its corner-
stones, according to the Commission report. 0 4  The
message from the industry and the Commission is clear:
the technology is here, and the United States is ready to
use it now.
FAA Chief Hinson ties the importance of pursuing this
program to the broader economic goal of encouraging
worldwide use of systems like those used in the U.S. be-
cause they are built by U.S. industry. 0 5 The AOPA shares
Hinson's enthusiasm for the GPS system, hoping to see it
refined enough to guide landings in poor weather and low
visibility.' 0 6 The proposal, which feasibly could save mil-
lions of dollars as older and more expensive systems are
replaced, 10 7 may find support from Gore's cost-cutting
"reinventing government" panel.' 08
Pending legislation, however, may put too much stake
in the system's success. The bill, a one-year authorization
funding the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), prohib-
its the FAA from developing or procuring microwave
landing systems (MLS) beyond those contracts in place on
Jan. 1, 1994.109 Senate aviation subcommittee Chairman
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.), who sponsored the legislation, said
he saw "no need to continue to fund this program for no
better reason than the Europeans might decide in 1995 to
deploy MLS.""t 0 Although Hinson has decided not to
wait for the International Civil Aviation Organization to
104 Id.
105 FAA Administrator Intends Only Minimal Testing for Alcohol, supra note 96, at 352.
106 David Field, Pilot's Eyes in Space; Satellite System Helps Planes Find Route to Run-
way, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at B7.
107 Id. Installing the necessary equipment for GPS use costs about $15,000 per
aircraft and $100,000 per airport for a simple two-hour installation of the radio
transmitter; instrument landing systems, however, may cost $100,000 per aircraft
and up to $1.5 million at each airport runway. Id.
108 See supra notes 78-79, and accompanying text.
-o Senate Panel Considers One-Year Authorization to Keep Door Open for FAA Changes,
WKLY. OF Bus. AvIATION, Oct. 4, 1993, at 141. The shorter term legislation was
proposed by Senate aviation subcommittee Chairman Wendell Ford (D-Ky.) to
allow for the likelihood of FAA restructuring in the near future. Id.
110 Id.
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decide on a technology for global satellite navigation,"'
he opposes the MLS cutoff provision because the full
adaptability of GPS to civil aviation is still unknown, and it
might be prudent to continue MLS development as a
fallback." 2
B. FINANCIAL STRENGTH
Operating with losses exceeding two billion dollars an-
nually since 1990,'13 airlines are suffering perhaps most
obviously in the financial arena. Much of the losses, of
course, are attributable to regulatory inefficiency and lack
of foresight, as described above. But the airlines them-
selves are not blameless, and have taken steps toward
regaining financial respectability." 4
These steps, however, will not be enough to bring the
industry back to health, even in the wake of a general eco-
nomic recovery. 1 5 High fixed costs, coupled with a future
looming with large capital expenditures for new equip-
ment, place a heavy burden on the industry. 1 6 The air-
lines' first response, to cut fares drastically, might have
been predictable. Paul S. Dempsey, Director of the
Transportation Law program at the University of Denver
College of Law, notes that "airlines sell what is, in effect,
an instantly perishable commodity. Once a scheduled
flight pulls away from the jetway, any empty seats are lost
forever."'"1 7 Coupled with the short term marginal cost of
- FAA Administrator Intends Only Minimal Employee Testing for Alcohol, supra note
96, at 352.
112 Senate Panel Considers One-Year Authorization to Keep Door Open for FAA Changes,
supra note 109, at 141.
'" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. Though major airlines saw profits
of $1 to 2.5 billion from 1984 to 1989, they were, at the same time, taking on
long-term debt that grew as profits sagged and losses mounted. Id.
114 Id. After some review and reassessment, airlines have begun to purge them-
selves of unprofitable smaller hubs and services; to place a cap on capacity
growth; to modify labor agreements and more efficiently use equipment; and to
turn over spoke routes to regional partners better equipped for the market size.
Id.
115 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
116 Id. at 13.
17 Dempsey, supra note 5, at 20.
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filling a seat, "a bag of peanuts, a cup of Coca-Cola, and a
few drops of fuel," according to Dempsey, the result is
pricing below the actual cost of production in a competi-
tive market." 8 The losses grow and the debts compound.
Though urging the government to enforce the laws
against anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions with
more zeal, the Commission plainly opposed any attempt
at reregulation of routes and fares."t 9 Those areas, the
Commission concluded, should be left to the marketplace
and to boardroom discussions.12 0  The slow, cumber-
some, disjointed government process is, in great part, re-
sponsible for the industry's predicament today, said
Commission Chairman Baliles,12 ' and more of the same
will not solve the dilemma.122
1. Establish an Independent Financial Advisory Committee to
the DOT
The Commission recommends establishing a presiden-
tially appointed advisory committee to the DOT to review
the financial health of the airlines and advise the Secretary
of Transportation when an airline's financial condition
poses a risk to the public or to the industry. 23 The Com-
mission discourages giving the DOT any more regulatory
authority because, it says, the DOT already has enough. 24
In fact, the DOT should continue to review in advance any
major ownership changes and be willing to exercise its ex-
isting authority.' 25
118 Id. Airlines will compete this way in competitive markets and simply hope to
survive, swallowing up weaker carriers until one has established market domi-
nance. Those that establish dominance in other markets will cover their losses
there in order to continue fighting for survival in competitive markets. Dempsey
blames this "death spiral" for unprecedented numbers of mergers, consolida-
tions, and bankruptcies. Id.
119 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
120 Id.
12, News Conference with Gerald Baliles, Federal News Service, Aug. 19, 1993.
122 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 15. When asked if the recommendation was made simply because the
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In its report, the Commission takes pains to represent
the independent financial committee as purely advi-
sory. 26 But this caveat has done little to allay fears that it
will lead to reregulation. Former Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) Chairman Alfred Kahn called the proposal the
Commission's "single most dangerous recommenda-
tion," 27 and he is joined by a host of others critical of the
report. 128
There is some consensus, however, that part of the
problem is a lack of diligence at the DOT. Dempsey con-
demns the Department for approving all twenty-one
mergers submitted, and thus allowing corporate raiders to
strip airlines of their assets.' 2 9  Furthermore, he says,
" [t]he Department of Transportation has long held juris-
diction to investigate the 'fitness' of airlines plagued with
debt. Here, like with respect to so many of its other statu-
tory responsibilities, DOT has shown no enthusiasm for
protecting the public interest."'' 30  Others feel the DOT
was indifferent to the needs of airlines when fuel prices
DOT was not doing its job, Chairman Baliles answered, "[y]ou've got it right on
the button." News Conference with Gerald Baliles, supra note 121.
126 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. "Its influence would come from
the quality of its membership, the strength of its analyses and the utility of its
advice...." Id.
127 Most Popular, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 2, 1993, at 351.
128 Experts Blast Commission Report, TRAVEL WKLY., Sept. 6, 1993, at 37. Early
opposition to the Commission report included former DOT secretaries John Bar-
num, Alan Boyd and Jim Burnley; former CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn; former
FAA Administrator Allan McArtor; and former DOT policy chief Jeffrey Shane.
The panel was organized by the Federal Bar Association. Id. Comments on the
recommendation ranged from "the camel's nose under the tent" (leading to rer-
egulation) (Kahn), to "[creating] a shadow government" (McArtor), to "stupen-
dously poor" (Burnley). Id. In a supplemental opinion, Commission member
John E. Robson joined the view that the advisory committee could be a "trojan
horse" for reregulation. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
129 Dempsey, supra note 5, at 13-14.
13o Id. at 24. Dempsey suggested creating an independent agency outside the
DOT to handle economic matters in 1991. He went further, however, to suggest
that the agency have regulatory authority, rather than simply an advisory capacity.
Id. at 46. Professor Dempsey, an expert consulted by the Commission concerning
deregulation, also recommended in 1991 that the FAA split off as an independent
agency from DOT. Id. Although the Commission seems to have missed Demp-
sey's entire point about the harm done by deregulation, his ideas clearly carried
some weight.
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shot up and traffic dropped. Had the Department been
more sensitive to requests for relief, some bankruptcies
might have been avoided. 13  But not everyone agrees that
an independent advisory committee is the answer. For-
mer FAA Administrator Allan McArtor said that if DOT
employees are not doing the job right, "you should give
them the tools to do it better," rather than create a
"shadow government [to] look over their shoulders."' 132
2. Restructure the Bankruptcy Laws
Recognizing that bankrupt airlines face difficult finan-
cial hurdles themselves, 133 as well as affecting the general
public and the industry as a whole, the Commission con-
cludes that bankruptcy code reform is long overdue. 134
Bankrupt carriers tie up scarce airport gates and interna-
tional routes as they receive extensions for reorganiza-
tion. 135  The Commission recommends, therefore, that
bankruptcy judges be required to make findings in indi-
vidual cases to support granting an extension of the 120-
day limit on reorganization, and that a one-year absolute
limit be imposed on the exclusive right of a bankrupt air-
line to file its reorganization plan. 3 6
- See Ease the Squeeze on U.S. Airlines, supra note 51, at 7. Many airlines joined an
Air Transport Association (ATA) petition that called for a list of actions to ease
the financial burden, specifically, a break on the eight percent fuel tax and a re-
lease of oil from U.S. reserves. Id. The ATA, weak and rumored to be near dis-
bandment because of tensions among debt-weary airlines, was revitalized by a
cooperative front on the tax issue. Airlines 'One Voice' Enables A TA to Pursue Tax,
Regulatory Relief, AVIATION DAILY, Aug. 31, 1993, at 335.
1.2 Experts Blast Commission Report, supra note 128, at 37. Significantly, criticism
of the actions (or inactions) of the DOT comes both from proponents of reregula-
tion, see Dempsey, supra note 5, at 37, and from supporters of deregulation. Ex-
perts Blast Commission Report, supra note 128, at 37.
133 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
134 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
11. Id. America West, for instance, recently requested its seventh extension of
time for reorganization. America West asks Court for Seventh Extension of Right to Reor-
ganize, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Sept. 27, 1993.
""' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. The Commission also recom-
mends placing limits on the time in which bankrupt carriers may assume or reject
their leases for airport gates, to free up idle space for healthy carriers; allowing
government bodies whose claims are not tax related, such as airports and the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), to sit on creditors' committees and
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Possible abuse of the bankruptcy laws to compete with
healthy carriers has been one of the most widely cited rea-
sons for the self-destructive, cut-throat competition that
emerged from financial distress. 37 Thus, there is little
opposition to the Commission's recommendation to re-
form the code. In fact, Transportation Secretary Pena
suggested considering the changes in other industries as
well. 138
3. Provide Tax Relief
Although no single factor is responsible for the airline
industry's near collapse, the Commission found that a re-
turn to financial prosperity would be significantly im-
peded by certain tax provisions.' 39 The following three
major recommendations are highlighted in the report.
a. Amend the AMT So That Airlines Are not Paying
Taxes at the Same Time They Are Operating
with Losses
As discussed above, the Alternative Minimum Tax has
required the airline industry to pay $670 million to the
government while it simultaneously lost $10 billion.'40
The reform would affect other capital intensive industries,
such as steel producers and oil drillers, who must make
have a voice in reorganization and debt-structure planning; and clarifying code
provisions concerning aircraft leases to allay lessors' concerns and to allow other
airlines to obtain better lease terms for their planes. Id.
Though the recommendations seem to penalize the bankrupt carrier, they may
instead help it by providing a basis for creditor support. Lessors asked to affirm
their leases on a bankrupt carrier's planes, for example, deserve to know their
exposure is limited; and the PBGC should have a say in the financing of unfunded
pension liabilities during reorganization.
137 Id. at 15.
118 Meserve, supra note 45. In an interview with CNN anchor Jeanne Meserve,
Pena was noncommittal about airlines' abuses of bankruptcy laws, but said, "if
we're going to reform the bankruptcy laws, should we look at bankruptcies for all
companies? . . . Perhaps others are abusing [them]." Id.




large capital expenditures despite low profit margins.' 4 '
Though the tax has a purpose in preventing the use of
excessive deductions to avoid taxation, 42 it clearly oper-
ates unfairly when it burdens companies that are already
in financial distress.
b. Roll Back Ticket and Cargo Taxes to Pre-1990
Levels
In 1990, passenger ticket and cargo waybill taxes in-
creased twenty-five percent, costing airlines, passengers,
and shippers another $900 million annually.' 43 Though
the revenue was earmarked for a trust fund for aviation-
related projects, it instead went toward general deficit re-
duction. 14 4  This problem has apparently been cor-
rected, 45 but the increased taxation itself is extra baggage
for the debt-laden airlines. With apparent indignation at
the misappropriation, the Commission calls for a return
to eight percent tax on passenger tickets and five percent
tax on cargo waybills, down from ten percent and six and
a quarter percent, respectively. 46
Though any reduction in taxes is likely to garner sup-
port from the beleaguered airlines, Hinson warns that the
passenger and cargo tax reductions will remove needed
revenue from a fund that would provide capital for future
improvements at congested domestic airports. 47 Without
directly criticizing the recommended decreases, Hinson
suggests a closer look at the balance of give and take,
141 Airline Commission Calls for Changes in Tax Policy, supra note 34, at 335.





"47 Airline Ticket Rollback Would Take Away Needed Revenues, FAA Chief Says, BUREAU
OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 29, 1993, at G 187. Be-
sides reducing ticket and cargo taxes, the Commission also recommends that the
FAA's allocation of the airport trust fund be reduced from 75% to 70% as long as
the FAA remains part of the federal budget process. COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, at 16. The proposal recognizes that domestic carriers already pay their fair
share of the FAA budget through ticket and cargo user taxes. Id.
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pointing out that getting relief now means a much longer
wait for projects that could immediately reduce conges-
tion and delays. 148
The measure could also meet opposition in Congress
from the likes of Senator John Danforth, a member of the
Senate Finance Committee, who views the tax rollback as
"robbing Peter to pay Paul."'' 49 Furthermore, Congress is
eyeing higher air and sea passenger fees to make up for
lower tariff collections under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). t 0 Given the choice between
cutting entitlement spending and increasing revenues, the
administration has opted for the latter.'
c. Exempt Airline Fuel from Proposed Transportation
Tax
The Commission rather plainly states that "[a]t a time
when the United States is looking for ways to strengthen
the airline industry, an additional tax seems ill-ad-
vised."' 2 The Commission estimated that the new tax
148 Airline Ticket Rollback Would Take Away Needed Revenues, FAA Chief Says, supra
note 147, at G187. Hinson told the Senate Aviation Subcommittee that the ad-
ministration wants to maintain AIP funding at its current $1.8 billion level to ad-
dress congestion problems. Id. He more than realized his wish: Subcommittee
Chairman Wendell Ford introduced legislation in the fall authorizing $2.05 billion
for the AIP in fiscal 1994. Sen. Ford's FAA Bill Would Extend AIP for One Year, AIR-
PORTS, Sept. 28, 1993, at 384. Sen. Ford's bill also echoed some Airline Commis-
sion recommendations by requiring the FAA to review its structural, personnel,
and procurement problems, and report on its findings by March 30, 1994, see supra
part V.A. 1.; by prohibiting the FAA from giving international routes to foreign
carriers unless the foreign country provides equivalent rights, see infra part V.C. 1.;
and by prohibiting further procurement of microwave landing systems (in antici-
pation of GPS implementation), see supra part V.A.3.
,49 Airline Ticket Rollback Would Take Away Needed Revenues, FAA Chief Says, supra
note 147.
150 Panetta: Higher Transport Fees Still 'Leading Candidate'for NAFTA Funding, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), Oct. 21, 1993, at A202.
'5' Id. Though the administration expressed willingness to look at other alter-
natives, it is clearly targeting increased passenger fees-collected through cus-
toms-to fund the expected five-year loss of $2.35 billion. Id. Allocating such fees
away from the airlines and airports, however, is one of the problems targeted by
the Commission. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-17.
5.2 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
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would cost the industry $506 million a year. 5 3 That fig-
ure represents about thirty percent of the profits airlines
posted in 1988, when they earned record profits of $1.7
billion.' 54 But the fractious ATA, uniting finally in oppo-
sition to the tax, 155 helped pressure Congress late in the
summer to grant the airline exemption. 56
Implementation of this recommendation may seem to
have been comparatively easy when it comes to pushing
for passenger and cargo tax relief. While tax burdens on
business and industry grow to meet budget goals under
President Clinton's deficit-reduction plan, ATA support-
ers will have a hard time arguing for actual reductions in
their industry taxes. 57 When the fuel tax was first cre-
ated, ATA President James Landry expressed his concern
that the administration and Congress "seem indifferent to
the cumulative effect of federal policies on the airline in-
dustry."'5 8 Perhaps the test will be whether other Com-
mission proposals 159 are given similar consideration, or if
15' Id.
154 John H. Cushman, Jr., An Uneven Corporate Tax Bite, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18,
1993 at DI. See Robert L. Mandel,Jet Fuel Taxation: Current State Approach and the
Need for Congressional Limitations, 58J. AIR L. & CoM. 103 (1992) for a discussion of
state fuel taxation measures and their effects on airline tax burdens. Mandel ar-
gued in 1992 that Congress must "take immediate action towards balancing the
tax burden upon the airlines to sustain their economic viability." Id. at 140. At
the time, Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) had been added to the list of state
impositions on the airlines, and threw out of balance state and federal taxation of
airlines. Id. Congress's new fuel tax seems an attempt to shift the balance the
other way.
'5 Airlines 'One Voice' Enables A TA to Pursue Tax, Regulatory Relief, supra note 131.
To Keep U.S. Airlines Flying, STAR TRIB., Aug. 21, 1993, at 18A. The two-year
exemption was included in the new budget bill. Airline Commission Gives Industry
Recommendations, Moneyline (Cable News Network, Aug. 19, 1993).
151 See Enactment of Tax Relief for Airlines Called Problematic by Commission Member,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Sept. 9, 1993, at G173.
158 Airlines Still Need Tax, Regulatory Relief National Commission Concludes, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), Aug. 20, 1993, at G160.
'19 Other recommendations made by the Commission include: full deductibility
of flight crew per diem payments (cost of meal and entertainment expenses for
crew members on layovers currently only 80% deductible); allocation of funds for
incoming passengers and cargo in proportion to that collected in Customs, INS
and Agriculture inspection fees; rigorous policing of AIP grants to prevent munic-
ipalities from diverting funds from airport improvements to general municipal
use; close scrutiny of the use of passenger facility charges (PFCs) to stay in keep-
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this was a token consolation from the administration.
C. GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
While domestic air traffic growth has been in something
of a slump since 1987,160 U.S. carriers have seen a sharp
increase in international traffic, both passenger and cargo,
since 1986.161 Turning its focus from the mistakes of the
past to the prospects of the future, the Commission is
looking to the international arena for growth and profit.
According to Commission Chairman Baliles, focusing on
profitability rather than market share will be an important
first step toward financial recuperation. 62
1. Work Toward Multi-National Agreements
The Commission emphasized the need for liberal
global competition and condemned as obsolete the bilat-
eral agreements that grew out of the 1944 Chicago Con-
vention. 63 These agreements have become increasingly
contentious and protectionist, inhibiting U.S. efforts to
open up competition and even resulting in foreign access
to U.S. markets without equivalent rights running the
ing with FAA requirements; and Presidential consideration of releasing crude oil
reserves during fuel shortages and short-term price spikes to alleviate the harsh
impact on the airlines and the economy. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-
17.
6 Baliles Says Bilaterals are Obsolete, But Instant Open Skies is No Cure, AIRLINE FIN.
NEWS, Sept. 20, 1993. The exceptional number of passengers boarded in 1992 is
attributable to drastically reduced fares and is not indicative of a general market
upswing. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; see also supra note 50 and accom-
panying text.
'6' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
62 Baliles Says Bilaterals are Obsolete, but Instant Open Skies is No Cure, supra note
160.
163 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. The Commission used the markets
with two of the U.S.'s largest trading partners to illustrate the restrictive, outmo-
ded results of such agreements: A study done for three dozen Canadian and U.S.
cities showed that only 30% of the major international carriers were allowed to
schedule non-stop service, and only 8% could compete with Canada's own air-
lines. Air travel with Canada had grown only 16%, compared to 64% growth with
all other U.S. trading partners. Furthermore, Japan allows nonstop service from
only 15 U.S. cities, a situation made more implausible by the fact that more than
40 U.S. states have trade and investment offices in Tokyo. Id. at 21.
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other way. '64 The initial recommendation, therefore, is to
focus negotiating efforts on creating a non-restrictive,
non-discriminatory multi-national operating environment
for airlines and to push for liberal, multi-national
agreements. 165
The Commission, however, approaches its recommen-
dation with the realization that many other trading blocs,
including the European Community (EC), are not of like
mind. 166 A tendency of other countries to attribute poor
financial performance solely to the presence of U.S. com-
petition has contributed to "a growing nastiness in inter-
national aviation relationships between the U.S. and its
164 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. Small national carriers fear com-
peting with U.S. carriers on a "level playing field," stating that opening the skies
would largely benefit U.S. airlines which already have an advantage in overseas
markets. Robin Sidel, Foreign Airlines Reject U.S. "Open Skies" Policy, REUTER Bus.
REP., Nov. 2, 1993. U.S. carriers claim, however, that charges in Europe are
driven up by as much as 30% through practices such as the ground-handling mo-
nopolies at Frankfurt, Milan, Madrid and Barcelona. Germany's new terminal
navigation charging formula, for example, is designed to benefit smaller planes
and will cost Delta an extra $1 million annually in operating costs. Europe's Airlines
Clash Over Solution to Crisis, AvIATION EUROPE, Sept. 23, 1993 at 1. While the neces-
sity for reforming airline agreements is widely recognized, Lufthansa chairman
Juergen Weber cautioned, "the record of the U.S. airline industry gives no con-
vincing proof of why they should take the lead." Sidel, supra.
165 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
Id. As negotiations progress between the U.K. and the U.S., the possibility
of multi-national agreements in Europe becomes more distant. Baliles Acknowledges
Roadblocks to Multilaterals, Open Skies, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 17, 1993, at 435. U.K.
Transport Secretary John MacGregor warned that the group of "wise men" cur-
rently studying Europe's struggling airline industry are ill-equipped to negotiate a
multi-level agreement on behalf of countries such as Germany, France and the
U.K. EC Multilateral Negotiations Not Likely in Near Future, Says U.K. Official, AVIATION
DAILY, Sept. 16, 1993, at 423. In fact, British Airways (BA) and the Association of
European Airlines (AEA) have diverged sharply over issues of regulation, protec-
tionism and state subsidies, with BA on the side of liberal competition and the
AEA pushing for relaxation in the European competition rules and further subsi-
dies for flag carriers. Airline Executives Urge Committee to Reject State Subsidies for Carri-
ers, Anti-trust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 30, 1993, at 453. Chairmen for
British Midland, Virgin Atlantic and SAS joined BA in its public stand against the
AEA's push toward further protectionist policies. Europe's Airlines Clash Over Solu-
tion to Crisis, AVIATION EUROPE, Sept. 23, 1993, at 1.
Instead, MacGregor urges a liberal bilateral agreement between the U.K. and
the U.S. that clearly moves away from regulation, protectionism and state subsidy
and that will "provide a pathfinder" for other agreements in Europe. EC Multilat-
eral Negotiations Not Likely in Near Future, Says U.K. Official, supra.
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trading partners," according to former DOT official Jef-
frey Shane, who says the biggest problem the United
States faces in shifting toward multi-national agreements
is "find[ing] anyone to talk to."'1 67 Indeed, Delta Chair-
man Ron Allen journeyed before the AEA to ask that the
groundwork be laid for open skies talks between the U.S.
and the EC, but he received a cold shoulder from Eu-
rope's airline bosses.' 6 8 Baliles believes much of the op-
position to the change comes from a tendency for airlines
to overreach a little when discussing the possibility of
open skies.' 69 The DOT itself has defined "open skies"
with incredibly rosy vision,' 7 0 probably scaring off most
foreign airlines who hear the term in any context. The
Commission, therefore, defined some short-term issues
for the slow transition to a more competitive global re-
gime and made the following recommendations.
a. Raise the Foreign Investment Limit to 49% Voting
Equity
The Commission cautiously urges that such foreign in-
vestment in U.S. airlines must be accompanied by a liberal
bilateral agreement containing equivalent reciprocal op-
portunities for the United States, and that the foreign in-
vestor must not be government-owned.' 7 ' This
recommendation serves two broad purposes: to provide
167 Multilateral Pacts with the U.S. Recommended by Former DOT Policy Official, AVIA-
TION DAILY, Aug. 25, 1993, at 305.
'68 Europe's Airlines Clash Over Solution to Crisis, supra note 164, at 1.
ISO Baliles Acknowledges Roadblocks to Multilaterals, Open Skies, supra note 166, at
435.
170 In the matter of defining "Open Skies", DOT order 92-8-13, Aug. 5, 1992, at 13.
The definition includes such open-ended and liberally competitive provisions as
(1) Open entry on all routes;
(2) Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes;
(3) Unrestricted route and traffic rights;
(8) Open code-sharing opportunities;
(9) Self-handling provisions; and
(11) Explicit commitment for non-discriminatory operation of and access for
computer reservation systems.
Id. at 14-16.
171 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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new sources of capital to ailing U.S. airlines, and to show
a good-faith effort toward reaching competitive, multi-na-
tional agreements. 72  British Airways Chairman Colin
Marshall, in the midst of renegotiating a bilateral agree-
ment with the United States, expressed his hope that the
recommendation would be approved, raising the foreign
investment limit from the current 25% to the 49% that
the United Kingdom and European Community already
allow. 173  Transportation Secretary Pena indicated that
the administration is interested in the proposal, adding
that the U.S.-U.K. bilateral agreement may depend on its
approval in Congress. 174
Opposition to the recommendation, however, may gain
strength as the big three-American, Delta and United-
see formerly weak and bankrupt foes gain competitive
footing with the infusion of capital from foreign inves-
tors. 75 The megacarriers fear that such deals, without
truly open skies, will allow foreign subsidization of com-
peting airlines without giving the big U.S. airlines the
chance to compete internationally. 76  Although airline
172 Id.
173 British Airways Hopes Positive US-UK Talks, REUTERS FIN. REPS., Oct. 4, 1993.
BA's failed attempt to invest in struggling USAir last year may have been substan-
tially due to its bid for a 44% share in the airline's equity and several representa-
tives on the board of directors. James T. McKenna, USAir-BA Pact Will Spark New
Transatlantic Battle, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1992, at 26. Early in
1993, however, BA and USAir concluded an agreement for a much smaller stake
in the airline-about 20% voting stock and nearly 25% equity and three seats on
the board with substantially less control, Robert L. Rose & Brian Coleman, British
Airways Buys Stake in USAir, Drawing Protests from Other Carriers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22,
1993, at A3-and received the administration's blessings. Richard M. Weintraub,
Rebuilding USAir; Investment by British Airways Gives Carrier a Big Lift, WASH. POST,
Mar. 22, 1993, at Fl.
174 House Aide Says Lawmakers May Examine Raising Limits on Foreign Investment, Int'l
Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), Sept. 17, 1993.
7-5 See Weintraub, supra note 173. British Airways' $300 million injection into
USAir reduced the ailing airline's debt, opened access to international markets,
and created a partnership that USAir chairman Seth Schofield hopes will lead to
better service and more efficient operations. Id.
17,; See, e.g., Donna Kelley, British-USAir Deal Stirs Talk on Airline Policy (CNN
News Broadcast, Nov. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN File) (inter-
viewing Mark Dunkerly, vice president of commercial and government affairs for
British Airways; Scott Yohe, vice president of government affairs for Delta; and
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analystJulius Maldutis predicts that service, fares, and job
security will improve with foreign investment, contrary to
arguments from the big three, he says there is a funda-
mental failure of U.S. aviation policy when "we are asking,
in effect, foreign governments to come and rescue our
carriers."'77
b. Elevate Status of Air Service Negotiations
U.S. negotiating teams presently consist of foreign ser-
vice officers who are pulled out of their specific career
paths and temporarily assigned to the Office of Economic
and Business Affairs at the Department of State. '7  This
rotation of negotiators leads to a lack of continuity and
expertise on the United States' side of the table. Other
countries delegate the duties to higher-level officials, re-
flecting the higher priority they attach to the
agreements. 179
The Commission recommends that the United States
strive for more continuity by strengthening the aviation
career track at the Department of State and by appointing
an ambassador-at-large to provide leadership in air ser-
vice negotiations. 0 It also urges that the United States
strictly enforce its current bilateral rights by imposing
sanctions, when necessary, for violations.' 8 ' The Com-
mission adds that increased foreign investment opportu-
nities and liberal multi-national agreements must not
adversely affect the availability of aircraft for the CRAF
program. 8 2
Julius Maldutis, airline analyst with Salomon Brothers, about the proposed agree-
ment between BA and USAir).
177 Id.




1'1 Id. at 24; see also supra note 30. But see Dempsey, supra note 5, at 32-42 (dis-
cussing the dangers of foreign ownership in a vital infrastructure industry such as
aviation).
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2. Bolster the Aerospace Manufacturing Industry
Yet another convergence of factors led manufacturers
into the financial mire. Besides the rash of canceled or-
ders from airlines laden with debt, manufacturers were hit
with U.S. military budget cuts and growing international
competition at the same time the world economy weak-
ened."" Subsidies for manufacturers in other countries
and international market and certification differences also
put U.S. builders and machinists at a disadvantage. 84
Though manufacturers and commissioners seem to
agree that the best measure of help would be to restore
the airlines to health,8 5 the Commission came up with
some suggestions of its own for giving the manufacturing
sector a boost.
a. Level the Playing Field
The Commission maintains that only in a fair and free
trading environment will U.S. aerospace manufacturers
thrive in the global aviation marketplace.8 6 It therefore
recommends expanding international agreements that set
limits on government involvement and subsidizing of air-
craft manufacturing projects; enforcing international
trade obligations and eliminating unfair trading practices;
encouraging international cooperation among aviation
components manufacturers to attract more capital and
market new products; increasing Export-Import Bank
funds in order to give U.S. manufacturers financial parity
with their foreign counterparts; trying to harmonize inter-
national certification standards; and avoiding unilateral
sanctions on exports unless national security is at risk. 8 7
b. Limit Manufacturer Liability
Open-ended products liability has driven insurance
111 News Conference with Gerald Baliles, supra note 121.
1- COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
185 News Conference with Gerald Baliles, supra note 121.
'- COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
187 Id. at 24-25.
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costs up so drastically that light aircraft sales have dwin-
dled because of sharp price increases. 188 General Avia-
tion Manufacturers Association president Edward
Stimpson says the industry has been ravaged by lawsuits.
Since the late 1970s, annual products liability costs have
increased 1,000%.189 Industry analysts say manufacturers
cannot get a high enough price for a new plane to cover
the costs of defending an old one. 190
Since at least 30% of the aircraft produced in the U.S.
have historically been exported, this market drop has cre-
ated a loss in the balance of trade.' 91 The General Avia-
tion Manufacturers Association (GAMA) says small plane
sales dropped from 13,000 to 500 annually between 1965
and 1982, and blames that decrease for causing 100,000
lost jobs in the U.S. and encroachment of foreign compet-
itors. 92  The Commission recommends a statute of re-
pose that would limit the liability of small aircraft
manufacturers to fifteen years from the date of
manufacture. 193
The International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers (IAM), traditionally shy of product liability
reform bills, emphatically endorsed the recommenda-
tion. 94 IAM representative John Goglia said the statute
188 Id. at 26.
189 Small Aircraft Builders Flee Market Due to Lawsuits, Morning Edition, National
Public Radio, Sept. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File.
-90 Id. Kevin O'Hara, of Allied Signal's General Aviation Avionics Division, says
manufacturers must add $70,000 to the price of a new plane to cover liability
costs. Joe Gose, Litigation Costs Cut Deliveries, Earnings in General Aviation, KAN. Crry
Bus. J., Sept. 17, 1993, at 1. Beech Aircraft, for instance, defended 203 lawsuits
over four years that cost an average $530,000 each. Id.
'9' Id.
19 Dina ElBoghdady, Hansen Sponsors Product Liability Bill to Help Aviation Industry,
States News Service, Sept. 14, 1993 available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Wire File.
In 1980, there were 29 U.S. and 15 foreign small plane manufacturers; by 1992,
29 foreign manufacturers were in business and only 9 were left in the United
States. Gose, supra note 190, at 1.
193 Id.
194 JAM Endorses 15-Year Product Liability Statute of Repose, WKLY. OF Bus. AVIA-
TION, Sept. 20, 1993, at 118. IAM's General Vice President for Transportation,
John Peterpaul, was a voting member of the Airline Commission. See supra note
55.
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of repose "will create thousands of new, high-paying jobs
... without costing the U.S. Treasury a dime.... We can
unshackle American technology and know-how and once
again lead the world in aircraft and equipment
innovation." 95
In September, Representatives Jim Hansen (R-Utah)
and Dan Glickman (D-Kan) sponsored legislation imple-
menting the recommendation. 96 Significantly, the bill
has gained support from AOPA-the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association-which represents a large portion of
the people who would file suits against manufacturers.' 97
Similar legislation sponsored by Senators Nancy Kas-
sebaum (R-Kansas) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) is pending
before the Senate.' 9 8
VI. WHAT THE REPORT DOES NOT TELL US
When the initial round of applause from airline execu-
tives, travel industries and politicians subsided, some of
the Airline Commission's weaknesses began to show up.
Criticism emerged from industry watchers and experts
from all imaginable sectors, targeting the report's glaring
omissions concerning marketing operations and competi-
tion and its general lack of detail. Some recommenda-
tions appear infeasible, while others are simply too
general to be meaningful.
Jg IAM Endorses 15-Year Product Liability Statute of Repose, supra note 194.
'98 ElBoghdady, supra note 192. Rep. Glickman has been pursuing similar, but
broader, legislation for five years; his attempts have thus far been thwarted by the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Id
197 Id.
-9 Id. Senate bill 1458, the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993, estab-
lishes a 15-year statute of repose for manufacturers, thus limiting liability for any
plane or part to 15 years from the date the plane or part was purchased. The
measure was approved Nov. 10, 1993, without objection. FAA Bill Approved by Sen-
ate Panel but Floor Action Not Likely Soon, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Nov. 12,
1993, at A217.
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A. OMITTED: COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS,
FREQUENT FLIER PROGRAMS, AND COMMISSION
OVERRIDES
Early in the Commission report, for instance, readers
are told that some issues, "such as computer reservations
systems (CRS) and frequent flier programs, after careful
examination required no action by this Commission. '
Commission member Herb Kelleher, though himself sur-
prised at the absence of these issues from the agenda, said
the Commission decided "after hours of discussion" that
such matters were best left in the business arena for the
judgment of the individual carriers.200
Anti-competitive pricing programs and costly market-
ing techniques such as CRS, frequent flier programs, and
travel agent commission overrides, however, deserve
some attention. Former CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn says
these programs make up "a big hunk of overall costs." '20 1
And while the Commission looked closely at ways to lift
primarily government-made burdens from airlines and
help them find new sources of capital, it ignored the pos-
sibility of some basic cost-cutting.20 2
Market concentration was also largely brushed off in the
Commission report. Since deregulation in 1978, domi-
nant airlines have swelled to control more than 60% of
'99 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
2 0 Jennifer Lawrence, Flying Unfriendly Skies, Airline Panel Slips, ADVERTISING
AGE, Aug. 30, 1993, at 4. Commission Chairman Baliles and Transportation Sec-
retary Pena echoed this opinion. See, e.g., Baliles, supra note 25; Transportation Sec-
retary Federico Pena Interviewed, supra note 44.
201 Lawrence, supra note 200. Kelleher said "[tlhe commission wasn't assem-
bled to sit down in a room and decide the issues .... The issues came from the
outside to us." Id. Therefore, the theory runs, since no one brought CRS and
frequent flier up, they weren't put on the agenda. Travel marketing consultant
James O'Donnell said the numbers show that a reduction in these marketing costs
could help eliminate losses, but carriers fear the consequences of being the first to
give up a program and risk losing market share; so they just consider it a cost of
doing business, grit their teeth and take their losses. Id.
202 See Airline Panel's Recommendations Not Likely to Advance as One Bill, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA), Sept. 10, 1993, at A174. Severin Borenstein, a recognized
expert on airline deregulation, said getting industry costs down may be of more
benefit overall than addressing debt burdens and limiting bankruptcy. Id.
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the market at about eighteen major airports, compared to
the less than 50% dominance of any one airline at any
airport during regulation.2 °3 Some of this trend toward
stifling competition can be traced to the use of CRS, fre-
quent flier programs and travel agent commission
overrides .24
A CRS, for instance, may improve an airline's chances
of selling its product 13-18% and, through its expedient
means of exchanging pricing proposals, facilitate implicit
price fixing.205 But only the larger carriers, such as Amer-
ican, United and Continental, have their own CRS20 6 and,
therefore, access to that particular manipulation of supply
and demand. Many smaller regional carriers affiliated with
the megacarriers in order to get "on line" in the CRS.2° 7
Frequent flier programs and commission overrides have
similar consequences, with the larger airlines suffering the
costs as "doing business" while smaller carriers are hit
hard-about 20% of their total costs-trying to match
commission payments or price competitively. 8
B. Fuzzy: SURVIVAL OF NEW ENTRANTS, QUALITY OF
OLD WORKFORCE, AND DETAILS OF PROPOSED
ENTITIES
Recognizing that the new carriers which entered the
market following deregulation were either quickly es-
corted out of the market, pitched into bankruptcy or swal-
lowed up by larger carriers, the Commission makes some
203 Dempsey, supra note 5, at 15.
204 Id. Dempsey lists nine "survival characteristics" of U.S. airlines: multiple
hubs, strategically located; frequent flier programs; computer reservation systems;
sophisticated yield management; fuel efficient fleet of standardized aircraft; low
debt (conservative growth); low wages/flexible work rules; superior service; and
international routes. Id. at 14. Note that only the international routes factor was
treated in any substance by the Commission.
209 Id. at 18.
2% Id.
207 Robert M. Hardaway & Paul S. Dempsey, Airlines, Airports and Antitrust: A
Proposed Strategy for Enhanced Competition, 58J. AIR L. & COM. 455, 480-81 (1992).
For example, United Express, Continental Express and American Eagle all fly
under a megacarrier's colors. Id.
208 Lawrence, supra note 200, at 4.
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general comments about ensuring that the DOT is recep-
tive to the latest rush of new entrants into the industry.0 9
The report's brief discussion, however, stays at the "good
intentions" level and is short on specifics. Apparently, no
consideration is given to the market forces that destroyed
the young carriers210 and no recommendations are of-
fered to help the new entrants that "can be an important
element in sustaining future competition." 21 '
In support of building up a better, more reliable, and
stronger workforce,21 2 the report's recommendations call
for policies, advisements, priorities and amendments.
The thoughts are nice, but the Commission could have
been more aggressive. The need for a professional career
track and training program in the transportation policy ar-
eas may become apparent as experienced staff retires or
leaves.21l Furthermore, the airline industry is a service in-
dustry. Professor Dempsey, describing the "survival char-
acteristic" of a flexible work force, says, "[h]appy
employees can give passengers a lovely trip, and lure
them back for another, and another. Angry, embittered
employees can do the opposite. '21 4
Also missing are any details of the proposed financial
advisory committee to the DOT. Some of the fears of
back-door regulation surrounding this recommendation
may be generated by the apparent free rein thrown to the
government for the appointment and use of the commit-
tee. The dubious caveat that "[n]ew DOT regulatory au-
thority is not recommended ' 21 5 offers little relief for
those who see "the camel's nose under the tent. ' 216 For
- COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
210 See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. Because the Commission de-
liberately kept its hands off those issues which it believed the market should han-
dle, see Baliles, supra note 25, it was unable to make recommendations for the
health of new airlines which is directly affected by those issues.
21, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
212 Id. at 19.
213 Experts Blast Commission Report, supra note 128, at 37.
214 Dempsey, supra note 5, at 26.
"'2 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
216 See Expert Blast Commission Report, supra note 128.
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those who may not oppose the recommendation, there is
still little more to it than the creation of another commit-
tee; "hardly ... decisive action," says Ed Perkins, editor
of the Consumer Reports Travel Letter. t7
Similarly left hanging is the question of how the DOT,
which has not been doing its job, and the airline industry,
which is mired in debt and inefficiency, are effectively go-
ing to run an independent ATC. Gore's report, which
substantially mirrors the Commission, 1 8 leaves the same
questions unanswered. And while FAA head Hinson has
the unique opportunity to spearhead this reform, 21 9 his
caution suggests that it may be years before the specifics
of how to get a "non-government" employee in the con-
trol tower are hammered out.220
VII. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Historically, attempts to revamp the U.S. airline indus-
try have been met by lethargic legislatures and fickle exec-
utives. 22  With NAFTA, health reform and deficit
reduction at the top of the list, the obvious question is
whether Congress and the President will just shelve the
colorful report which represents three months work for
the Commission. Already, the Senate Aviation Subcom-
mittee knows that the recommendations will not be
presented in one bill. 2 This means Congress will take its
time with the more controversial recommendations, or
perhaps attach the fate of some to other bills as riders.
Nevertheless, the recommendations will also be affected
by the presence of some unique factors, such as the "three
Ps." The Commission targeted what it calls a "3p" audi-
ence - press, public, and politicians - to gain wide sup-
217 Ed Perkins, Indecisive Plan, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 1993, at C2.
218 Gore Backs ATC Reform, Essential Air Services Cutbacks, supra note 77, at 375.
219 Don Phillips, Change is in the Air, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1993, at A27.
220 Id.
221 See, e.g., Baliles, supra note 25 (similar studies became fights for turf in bu-
reaucratic reorganization).
222 Airline Panel's Recommendations not Likely to Advance as One Bill, supra note 202,
at A174.
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port for its recommendations. 2 The Commission itself
shows more interest in its work than the typical govern-
ment task force. In early November the Commission's fif-
teen members wrote a stinging letter to Transportation
Secretary Pena protesting administration delays.224 The
letter states the members' clear concern that the adminis-
tration's draft report "calls for more than a dozen studies,
most with no deadlines, [which] duplicate earlier efforts,
including the Commission's. "225
A number of industry groups also have echoed the
Commission's impatience. A lobbying force representing
30 companies and trade groups connected with the airline
and travel industry is pushing for action on some of the
Commission's major proposals. 6  Perhaps it worked.
Early this year President Clinton, Transportation Secre-
tary Pena, FAA Administrator Hinson and Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors Chairman Laura D'andrea Tyson
announced the administration's endorsement of 49 of the
Commission's 59 recommendations. 2 7 The biggest hur-
dle, however, is still ahead. Convincing Congress to im-
plement these recommendations "will take a concerted
effort by the industry and the Clinton Administration
"9228
If this is more than just another obscure government
report from another unmotivated government task force,
and it certainly doesn't look like one, enough pressure
from the public and the industry may just keep the air-
lines' plight on the front lines when it finally reaches Con-
gress. However, if NAFTA and health care reform push
223 News Conference with Gerald Baliles, supra note 121.
224 Airline Commission Members Criticize Administration Delays on Recommendations,
WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, Nov. 8, 1993, at 193.
225 Id.
226 David Field, 1993 Was Painfulfor Airlines, Workers, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1994,
at D5.
227 Don Phillips & Richard M. Weintraub, Plan Would Reorganize Air Traffic Con-
trollers; Administration Proposes Shift From FAA, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1994, at A17.
228 Plan to Aid Airlines is Announced; Clinton Proposals Aim at Reviving Industry, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 1994, at IA (quoting Jim Landry, president of the Air
Transport Ass'n).
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the issue too far into the background, or if recent profita-
ble quarters lessen the sense of urgency, 29 waning enthu-
siasm may ring its death toll.
A. How THE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL STACK UP
1. FAA reform
Though widely supported and with the benefit of hav-
ing working predecessors in Germany, New Zealand,
South Africa and Switzerland, 230 an independent air traffic
control corporation may still face an uphill battle. Con-
gress, currently in control of the FAA's $4.3 billion
budget, will not lightly let go the purse strings2 3' or the
control.232 Additionally, the Department of Defense will
want to raise national security issues concerning military
use of the system.2 33 The administration, however, plans
to draft a bill by April calling for an ATC corporation that
will operate more like a business.3 4 Similar to Amtrak,
the corporation's stock would be government owned but
its revenues would come from a tax on airline tickets.23 5
Delta and American Airlines spokesmen applauded the
administration's initiative, but Congress is not ready to
jump on the wagon. 36 Fears that the proposed overhaul
would struggle in Congress were quickly reinforced by
members of the House and Senate who cited safety con-
2- See Weintraub, supra note 21, at C I.
2 0 First Step Toward ATC Corporation Already Taken, Study Says, AVIATION DAILY,
Sept. 23, 1993, at 466.
231 Weintraub, supra note 64, at D12.
232 New FAA Head Open to US Air Traffic Control Reform, REUTERS FIN. REP., Sept.
1, 1993.
23 Tilting Toward Pvivatization, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 30, 1993, at
19.
234 Plan to Aid Airlines is Announced; Clinton Proposals Aim at Reviving Industry, supra
note 228.
235 See Martin Tolchin, Let New Corporation Control Air Traffic, U.S. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at A16. The administration's apparent lack of concern over
funding the corporation through a ticket tax is indicative of its attitude in general
toward the Commission's tax relief proposals. See infra note 244.
2- Plan to Aid Airlines is Announced; Clinton Proposals Aim at Reviving Industry, supra
note 228.
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cerns. 237 Rep. James Oberstar, who is strongly opposed
to the measure, predicted it would be rejected by
Congress.238
2. DOT Financial Advisory Committee
Opponents of airline regulation will fight this recom-
mendation until it is so weakened that its purpose is de-
feated.23 9 The controversial recommendation, however,
does not go far enough for proponents of reregulation,
who would give the committee some added regulatory au-
thority, 240 thereby leaving the proposal without a moti-
vated lobby. Its strongest backers are the commissioners
themselves, though there is dissent even among them. 4'
3. Tax Relief
At a time when Congress and the administration are
concentrating on deficit reduction, tax rollbacks and ex-
emptions are hard to justify. Clinton has already trumped
airline woes with the deficit card by limiting the industry's
fuel tax exemption to two years from the five Congress
had drafted. 42 It was no one's surprise, therefore, when
the administration rejected the Commission's tax relief
proposals early this year.2 43 The biggest disappointment,
however, may have been the administration's reason for
excluding the tax measures from its endorsements. Im-
mediate tax relief is unnecessary, according to administra-
tion officials, because the economy has improved.24 4 The
237 Phillips & Weintraub, supra note 227. Sen. Ernest F. hollings (D-South Car-
olina) expressed "serious concerns" about safety but promised to work with
Transportation Secretary Pena; Rep. James L. Oberstar (D-Minnesota) said the
proposal is "fraught with danger" because the airlines would have financial incen-
tive to compromise safety. See Tolchin, supra note 235.
238 Clinton Proposes Body to Monitor Air Traffic in U.S., Hous. CHRON. Jan. 6, 1994,
at A2.
2-9 See supra note 128.
240 See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 5, at 44.
241 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
242 J.A. Donoghue, U.S. Airline Commission Proposals are Not New, AIR TRANSPORT
WORLD, Sept., 1993, at 5.
213 See Phillips & Weintraub, supra note 227.
244 Plan to Aid Airlines is Announced; Clinton Proposals Aim at Reviving Industry, supra
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Commission's warning that economic recovery will not be
enough has apparently gone unheeded. It was precisely
what many Commission members and industry experts
feared.45
4. Multi-National Agreements
The Commission spent a lot of time and space promot-
ing a recommendation that, though doubtlessly impor-
tant, over which it has little control. The commissioners
did have the foresight, however, to warn that its hope for
"open skies" was tempered by the reluctance of U.S. trad-
ing partners to open up to straight competition with U.S.
carriers.46 With patience and a little cooperation from
Europe, we may be able at least to open the road toward
"open skies."
5. Increased Foreign Ownership
Americans for a Sound Aviation Policy (ASAP), a group
of fourteen former government and industry executives,
academics, consumer activists, and journalists, has formed
in opposition to Commission recommendations.2 47 The
organization takes exception to increased foreign owner-
ship and tax relief proposals and questions whether safety
issues were adequately addressed.2 48 The Department of
Defense is likely to have something to say on this issue as
well, despite Commission assurances that the CRAF pro-
gram will not be affected. 249 Nevertheless, pressure from
note 228. "A strong economy will be the best medicine for what ails the aviation
industry," said chief Economic Adviser Tyson. Id.
245 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Delta Chairman Ronald W.
Allen said he is "concerned that the administration has not gone far enough in
addressing the need for tax and regulatory relief." Plan to Air Airlines is Announced;
Clinton Proposals Aim at Reviving Industry, supra note 228.
246 Commission Report, supra note 1, at 22-23.
247 National Aviation Commission Opposition Forms, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 9, 1993,
at 387. Among the members is Prof. Dempsey, who opposes any increase in for-
eign ownership of U.S. airlines for national security reasons. Dempsey, supra note
5, at 28-42.
248 National Aviation Commission Opposition Forms, supra note 247.
249 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
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the U.K. to raise the U.S. investment limit to equal that of
Europe in order to induce liberal air service agreements
has helped warm the administration up to the idea. En-
dorsed by Clinton earlier this year, the proposal to in-
crease to 49% the limit on foreign ownership of voting
stock in U.S. airlines should have strong support in Con-
gress as an avenue for new capital for domestic airlines. 5 °
The provision that the foreign carrier must reciprocate
may also help liberalize bilateral agreements.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In ninety days, the National Airline Commission tackled
a tough job: it reviewed, broke down, analyzed and at-
tempted to find a cure for a very sick, very complex indus-
try. Simply having put something together within its
short time allotment is an accomplishment.
The Commission's recommendations can be traced to a
single uniting theme: no government regulation. Even
where critics fear reregulation may creep back in, as in the
case of the financial advisory committee to the DOT, the
commissioners were careful to emphasize that no exten-
sion of regulatory authority is urged. Even where the re-
port is found lacking in recommendations concerning
anti-competitive practices and excessive marketing costs,
the omissions are always explained under the theory that
those issues are matters of private decision and boar-
droom discussion. No pure deregulationist would argue
that the government's hand belongs in such market-con-
trolled factors. The Commission set out to correct gov-
ernment errors, incompetencies and overreachings, and it
strayed little from its scope.
Perhaps the most damning criticism of the Commis-
sion's work comes from its lone dissenting member, John
Peterpaul.2 5' Condemning the recommendations as "sim-
ply follow[ing] the lead of the major trade associations,"
25- Clinton Proposes Body to Monitor Air Traffic in U.S., supra note 238.
251 Peterpaul's dissent is available through the Int'l Assoc. of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, of which he is vice chairman of transportation.
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Peterpaul charges that many Commission members were
"more interested in defending the political correctness of
the Airline Deregulation Act than getting to the core of
the industry's problems. 25 2 It is true, perhaps, that the
airline industry's greatest hurdles lie within their self-im-
posed business structure. Their predatory instincts may
not complement an infrastructure industry with a broad
public service base. But the Commission stuck to its guns
- it would not meddle in the airlines' private business
affairs.
If there is a practical, rather than ideological, fault with
the Commission's result, it is that it is too cautious.
Where recommendations were bound to draw criticism, it
would have been better to go far enough to gather sup-
port from the other side. Instead, some recommenda-
tions may be bound for obscurity at the hands of the
opposition without a decent fight. To keep its cause alive,
the Commission needs to allay concerns that the financial
advisory committee to the DOT is a back route to re-regu-
lation and gather support for its most important, most
plausible recommendations from re-regulation's
opposition.
As for the fate of the airline industry, it will not be
solved by an economic recovery, ninety-day commission
study, or a few smart business decisions. It will need a
long-term, concentrated, cooperative effort to dig itself
out of the trenches, of which this report is the first tiny
comprehensive step. Whether we return to broad-based
competition or continue on toward three megacarriers
and a network of regional carriers will depend both on
airlines' internal, self-propelled restructuring and on how
the industry follows through with its own
recommendations.
212 U.S. Airline Commission Was Timid, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 1,
1993, at 96. Vocal critic Robert Kuttner could not agree more. The Commission
"flamed out," he says, because of the influence of the airlines, "which want(]
bailouts but not rules." Robert Kuttner, Much Wind, Little Lift, Editorial, WASH.
POST, Aug. 20, 1993, at A23. But see Baliles, The Last Thing the Airlines Need is Re-
Regulation, Editorial, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1993, at C7 (responding to Kuttner).
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